The difficulty in reliably and efficiently detecting and locating buried unexploded ordnance (UXO) is a concern for the military. Tagging munitions and ordnance items before they are fired or launched would allow for a significantly more efficient means of locating buried UXO. Munition tagging can be accomplished by employing existing passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag technology, such as the Texas Instruments' solenoidal tags. This tagging approach would result in very low falsealarm rates compared to those currently experienced. The tags provide information on the munition's location and identity when the UXO tag interrogation module is brought nearby. This paper summarizes the analytical and experimental efforts Battelle pursued to reach these conclusions. Analytical efforts included modeling of the magnetic field's behavior to understand the requirements to transmit energy from the above-ground interrogator to the tag and from the tag back to the above-ground receiver. Laboratory work validated the modeling results and showed the feasibility of the technique. Field testing of a prototype system indicated the likely success of this approach to detecting buried UXO.
Introduction
D etecting buried unexploded ordnance (UXO) at military firing ranges and elsewhere is very difficult and expensive. To enable the military to conduct cost-effective training and research missions in the future, with increased safety for personnel and property and without negative environmental impact, significant advances in detection and identification of buried UXO must be pursued and implemented. This paper presents the results of analytical and experimental efforts that demonstrated the viability of using munition-mounted radio-fr-equency identification (REID) tags as buried-ordnance detection and identification aids. REJI) tagging of ordnance can provide a high probability of detection and a near-zero false-alarm rate. The tag provides discrimination between UXO and clutter items, a capability that is critical to reducing the cost of UXO remediation. This work was pursued because state-of-the-art passive REID tags can potentially provide information on the mumitions' location while maintaining compatibility with operational deployment. However, to ensure success, the detection range below the ground had to be quantitatively investigated.
The concept calls for fastening tags to the exterior of a candidate ordnance item as part of the manufacturing process. During the detection segment of the UXO remediation process, the UXO interrogation module provides energy to the tag by emitting a large magnetic field. The munition-mounted tag responds by emitting a low-level digital signal that is sensed by receivers on the UXO interrogation module. This research focused on low-frequency, passive (non-battery) RFID tags, a choice made early in the investigation. Extensive modeling of the RFID tag on the metal munition was performed to aid in understanding the tag-mounting parameters. The critical mounting concern is the required separation between the tag and the metal of the munition, because the customer required detection of munitions buried as deeply as one meter. For safety reasons, the transmitting coil and RFID tag had to be shown not to induce a large electric field near the munition, because too large a field might cause the munition to detonate.
Background
Various methods for detecting buried unexploded ordnance at military firing ranges have been investigated [1, 21. These techniques involved scattering energy off the munition and resolving the modified signal. Unfortunately, achieving consistent results using these methods has proven to be difficult and expensive. The techniques have also resulted in an unacceptable number of falsepositive indications, which will significantly increase the cost of remediation because of the expense of excavating non-UXO items. Using RFII) tags, false alarms can occur only when a munition explodes and the REID tag survives, an event that is thought to have a very low likelihood of occurring. A statistical investigation of this probability was beyond the scope of this effort.
The method examined here differs from these other methods in that detection of the munition is based on the energy received from a transmitting REID tag affixed to the munition, as depicted in Figure 1 . The detection signal does not result from energy scattered by the munition itself.
The ordnance-detection system comprises an interrogation module and the RFID tag. The above-ground interrogation module, used to search for tags, generates a large magnetic field. The tag harvests the transmitted energy to power its integrated circuit, and replies with a digital signal. The interrogation-module's receiving coil senses the digital signal transmitted by the tag, then reports detection and any embedded digital data. This might include information such as the munition type, serial number, and date of manufacture. One-meter-deep detection of UXO was deemed necessary to demonstrate feasibility.
After determining which passive RFID tags offered the highest probability of success in this application, additional electromagnetic and mechanical constraints were analyzed. Electromagnetic considerations involved characterization of the ability to energize and receive the reply from a passive RFID tag one meter from the excitation coil, the effect of the presence of the munition's metal on tag functionality, and the danger of the high-energy transmitting coil setting off buried munitions. Mechanical considerations involved finding ways to mount the RFID tags on existing metal munitions that allow RFID-tag survival and functionality, subject to the extreme accelerations associated with munitions and ordnance.
Tag Choice
According to Faraday's and Lenz' Laws, the eddy currents induced on a conductive munition will tend to oppose the magnetic field perpendicular to its surface. This opposition becomes greater nearer the munition's surface. Therefore, magnetic fields very near the munition will tend to be parallel to its surface. This condition suggests choosing a solenoidal-shaped tag mounted with its core parallel to the surface, allowing the most efficient harvesting of energy from the interrogation-module's magnetic field.
One candidate solenoidal tag was the Texas Instruments (TI) Thris RFID tag [3] . The decision was made to exploit these tags because of their operating frequency near 130 kHz, and their reliance on the magnetic field, both of which were favorable for maximum ground penetration of the transmitted energy. Figure 2 shows the This solenoid tags employed during this study. The tags comprise a copper coil wrapped around a ferrite core, other circuit elements, and a digitally-based integrated circuit that functions as a receiver, transmitter, and processor, with 64 bits of user-written data. The tags and readers employ frequency-shift keying (FSK) between 123 kHz and 134 kHz to transmit the tag's data to the reader.
The REID-system choice was influenced by the Tiris tag's response mechanism being more favorable in this application. The Tinis tags do not reply until after the interrogation module's transmitter has turned off, which allows detection of the weak tag signal in a quieter spectral environment. Competing RFID systems have tags that reply during reader interrogation, generally at half the 14 reader's transmitted frequency. This simultaneous transmitting and receiving process in non-Tinis systems forces their readers' detection systems to detect very small signals in the presence of very large signals. Although this detection can be accomplished, it requires very precise relative positioning of the transmitting and receiving coils to minimize the magnitude of the transmitted signal cross-coupled into the receiving coil. It was anticipated that maintaining the relative positions of the coils precisely would be very difficult while traversing artillery and bomb ranges. The required positioning accuracy is much less for the Tinis system, because the transmitter is turned off while the receiver is enabled.
Transmitting Coil
The passive Thris tags used in this study were intended to function with a separation between the reader and the tag of about one meter, under certain conditions. Because budgetary constraints Transmit Coil Figure 3 . Magnetic-vector equipotential lines near the metallic munition as the transmitting coil passes over the munition. The magnetic field is parallel to these equipotential lines. In accordance with Faraday's and Lenz' Laws, the generated eddy currents on the munition's surface oppose the component of the magnetic field that is perpendicular to its surface, coercing the magnetic field to be parallel to the munition's surface. Surface (inches) Figure 4a . The detection area for the UXO interrogation module system for the munition oriented horizontally. The center of the receiving coil mast be over the blue-colored detection area for the munition to be detectable. required that no changes be made to the RFlID tags themselves, the interrogation module had to be modified and made larger to achieve the required separation of one meter in the presence of the metal munition. We examined the basic magnetic-field equations to determine the possible ways to increase the field levels at longer ranges. The magnetic field emitted in the z direction, B 2 , by a circular loop of radius a in the x-y plane at a point located a distance r from the origin can be expressed, in jiW/M 2 , as
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This relationship simplifies when the point r is located far from the coil:
Equation (1) holds in regions near the coil, where the reduction as a funiction of r is slightly less than l/r . The magnetic field increases linearly with the area of the coil, with the current, and with the number of turns. For a given value of r (one meter) and a given value of area (a radius of one-half meter, to keep the interrogating module from being too large), it appears that one can arbitrarily increase B by either increasing the number of turns, N, or the current, L. Practical considerations will limit the amount of current that can be employed, but it still appears that arbitrary increases in the number of turns will yield increasingly large values of the magnetic field. Unfortunately, increasing the number of turns increases the inductance of the coil. The value of the inductance can be seen, in Equations (3) and (4), to increase as the square of the number of turns:
The voltage across the coil is proportional to the inductance as seen in Equation (5):
This relationship implies that the voltage is proportional to N. Thus, for a given coil current, an arbitrary increase in N can quickly drive the voltage across the coil to impractical values. An optimum combination of N and I must be determined, given the amount of current the batteries and drive circuit can provide, and the maximum tolerable voltage across the coil.
The final interrogation coil design had a diameter of one meter, and Litz wire with 270 strands of 38 American wire gauge (AWG) magnet wire. We employed 10 turns of Litz wire (N = 10) and approximately 16 amps rms, for a magnetomnotive force of 160 ampere-turns rms. These design values were confirmed to be effective through laboratory experimentation and electromagnetic modeling of the interrogation system and munition-mounted tag. No analytical optimization was attempted.
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The laboratory investigation provided insight into potential detection ranges, but it did not answer the basic physics question of whether or not the tag mounted on or near a metallic munition could function as needed.
Electromagnetic Considerations
While initial experimental findings confirmed the effectiveness of the Tinis tags in this environment, computer modeling of the magnetic fields was seen as essential to understanding the effects of design parameters and real-world constraints. The modeling effort added a quantitative perspective that would have been difficult, time-consuming, and expensive to achieve using experimentation. Modeling provided insight into behavior of the fields for distinct angular positions of the ordnance item (vertical to horizontal) as the above-ground coils were moved in a large groundarea survey. The effect of multiple ordnance items near the interrogating coils could also be determined. Because the practical range of frequencies that would be used were on the order of 100 kHz and the system antennas were in the near field, the two-and threedimensional finite-element models were solved using the low-frequency approximation to Maxwell's equations (no polarization current, dE/dt set to zero).
Considering the field generated by the above-ground interrogation module, the field amplitude drops significantly near the munition's surface, because of its finite conductivity and associated boundary conditions. The decrease in the magnetic-field amplitude at the tag can be as large as two orders of magnitude when moving the tag's position from the munition's surface to a separation of 2.54 mm (0.1 in). The exact change depends on the munition's material. As expected, lower conductivity in the metal ordnance object results in lower eddy-current amplitudes, and therefore lower loss in field level at the munition. Higher permeability of the material tends to increase the field near the munition. The proximity of the tag to the munition decreases the magnetic field near the tag; separation between the metallic surface of the munition and the tag is critically important.
In order to retain the munition's aerodynamic characteristics and to accommodate this required separation, the idea of grooves into which the tags would be placed was analyzed. Modeling indicated that groove cross-sectional shape had minimal influence on the field coupled into the tag. The important parameter was separation of the tag from a conductive surface. The length and width of the groove should be such that there is about 5 mm (0.2 in) of clearance between the tag's coil and the sides of the groove. The effect of the composition of the material potting the tag in the groove was also investigated. Non-conducting, permeable materials were found to aid in coupling the interrogation signal into the tag. For this reason, a ferrite spacer was placed between the tag and the munition. The ferrite creates a more favorable boundary condition near the conducting surface, and thereby allows more magnetic field into the tag's coils. The ferrite spacer has negligible effect on the signal transmitted from the tag to the surface. Figure 3 shows the magnetic-vector equipotential lines from a transmitting coil near the munition as the coil passed by. The magnetic field was parallel to these lines. Here, the munition was one meter deep, and was oriented vertically with respect to the surface. The transmitting coil passed over the munition's centerline. Regardless of the coil's position, the field lines aligned parallel to the munition's surface.
The Tinis transponders require a minimum quality factor, Q, [4] for them to respond to an interrogating signal. This specification results in a need to apply some minimum magnetic field, and to have the transponder in a material configuration that maintains its Q above a value of about 60. The limiting factor is generally related to nearby metal structures. In free space, the Q of the RFII) tag's coil was found to be about 94. The modeled results were calibrated with respect to this measured value.
Modeling studies indicated that the metal of the munition's casing had a significant impact on the Q of the tag. As expected, the presence of the munition decreased the inductance and increased the resistance of the tag's circuit, thereby lowering the Q value. Modeling indicated that a lift-off greater than 6 mm (0.24 in) from the munition's surface was required to keep the Q above 60 when air was the only medium between the munition and the tag.
Safety is critically important when dealing with munitions and ordnance. One has to ensure that the large electric field transmitted by the above-ground interrogation coil does not trigger buried UXO. Modeling has shown that the electric fields induced on the surface of and inside the munition by the transmitting coil and/or the tag would be not exceed a threshold that might cause the munition to detonate. The predicted electric fields were compared with the curves of hazards of electromagnetic radiation to ordnance (HERO) [5] that specify the maximum safe level of the electric field near munitions as a function of frequency. At 100 kHz, the maximum safe electric fields are between 10 and 40 V/m rms, depending on the sensitivity of the munition. The current design of the one-meter-diameter transmission coil has been predicted to produced about 0.5 V/m at 100 kHz immediately below the coil, a value that lies well below the HERO safety level. The electric field generated by the Tinis tag exhibits a much lower amplitude.
The detection area of the tagged munitions on the ground surface was also examined. The detection area was calculated based on the receiving coil design incorporated in the prototype system, and the tag's replying magnetic field normal to the surface. Figure 4 shows the detection area for the UXO interrogation module, based on calculated field levels. The detection areas have different shapes, depending on munition orientation. The shapes do not change with depth; however, the detection areas do spread out slightly as depth decreases. The four circles on the left represent the position of the above-ground transmitting coil (large circle) and the relative positions of the three receiving coils (smaller circles). One of the receiving coils was above the detection area in this configuration. Theory predicts that the depicted munition would be detected in this situation.
Detailed results of the modeling have been discussed elsewhere [6, 7] . The following general findings are included as a summary of that work: * The metallic munition repels the magnetic field, making separation from the surface important for inputting energy to activate the tag.
* The magnetic field near the munition's surface tends to be parallel to the surface. o The munition's effect of repelling the field also increases the signal transmitted from the tag toward the detection system. * The separation between the surface and the tag is important. A 6.3-mm (0.25-in) gap increases the field by a factor 2.5 over a 2.5-mm (0. 1-in) separation.
* The tag's location on the munition is important. For example, on the long side of the munition, it is advantageous to locate the tag near the ends rather than near the center.
* When the tag is embedded in a "groove," a wider and deeper groove is better; however the cross-sectional shape of the groove is less important.
* Permeable filler in the groove helps (,u cores, ur of 500, in epoxy) to get energy into the tag. The filler has little effect on the signal from the tag back to the surface.
* Lower conductivity in the metal ordnance object results in lower eddy-current amplitudes, and therefore lower loss.
* Soil conductivity has little effect on magnetic-field strength.
* The tag's Q is strongly influenced by the conducting munition body.
Mechanical Considerations
The mechanical considerations were twofold. First, the tag had to survive launch acceleration and impact. Second, the tag had to be mountable on existing munitions without significant modification to the munition.
Launch acceleration and velocity testing explored the tag's survivability potential. These tests were conducted at Battelle's West Jefferson, Ohio, munitions testing facilities [6] . A "soft catch" was employed, using a combination of Styrofoamn and duct tape to reduce deceleration forces. Tiris tags were removed from their glass containers, potted, and placed inside polypropylene cylinders that were inserted as shotgun-shell loads. Tag survival was determined using a Tinis reader to monitor the tag's digital response. Initial results were encouraging. A single tag was fired 11 times; it survived the first 10 events. The results are listed in Table 1 . The final firing, at 67,000 g, allowed the polypropylene slug to strike a steel plate, which did incapacitate the tag. Shot number 8 is highlighted in the table. The tag described in this line survived accelerations up to 43,000 g and a maximum velocity of 247 m/s (809 fi/s). Informal discussions with ordnance experts indicated the highest acceleration/deceleration levels experienced by US munitions were in the low 20,000 g (anecdotal information did not indicate if this value was acceleration or deceleration). Further testing and analysis would be needed to ensure tag fuinctionality meets acceleration/deceleration rates acceptable to the government. The initial research into the mounting feasibility and potential approaches was analytical; no physical testing was performed during the timeframe of this investigation. Five candidate munitions were considered for tagging. The candidates included munitions that were used at firing ranges, and that stayed within one meter of the surface when they entered the ground and did not explode. These munitions were the BLU-97, MK-52 practice bomb, M720, M229, and 155 mm projectile. Because these munitions vary considerably in physical shape and size, no universal attachment method seemed realistic. However, mounting a tag to each munition type was deemed feasible with minor modifications to the munition. Distinct techniques were proposed for each of these munitions. Figure 5 shows one potential approach.
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Evaluation and Testing
Experimental efforts involved the design, fabrication, and tuning of the custom coil circuits. The tuning circuits for the highvoltage, one-meter-diameter transmitting coil and the corresponding receiving coils were built. The basic results of the modeling were verified, although not every parameter was examined in the lab and field. Figure 6 shows the laboratory setup for characterizing the one-meter transmitting coil and the Tinis tags. The Tiris tag was mounted on a BLU-97 munition 4.3 mm (0. 17 in) from the steel body using a 2.8-mm-thick ferrite spacer and a 1.5-mm-thick circuit-board spacer. The circuit board allowed probes to be attached for monitoring voltage levels. The frequency-domain view of the Tinis tag's response showed the frequency-shift keying between 123 kHz and 134 kHz.
Lab Evaluation
Experiments were performed to determine the distance from a transmitting coil that a tag could be activated by measuring the voltage level at the tag's coil. We observed ranges greater than two meters in this configuration. These lab experiments were repeated with the tag mounted on an inert munition. Similar results were seen, as long as the tag's separation from the munition was 20 sufficient. Later experiments observed the fieldd generated by the tag at the above-ground receiving coil. For optimized conditions, munition/detection coil separations greater than one meter were achieved in the lab with the tag on a munition. Tagged munitions were also detectable at one meter in the experimental field trials in dry clay soils. These findings supported the modeling results.
As expected and predicted by the modeling, the tag's proximity to the munition's surface was important, not only for receiving a signal, but also for maintaining a high Q value so the tag could respond. In the lab setting with the BLU-97 munition, a separation distance of 4.3 mmn (0. 17 in) produced acceptable results. This separation was less than the 6 mm minimum predicted by theory because a layer of ferrite 2.8 mm thick was placed between the tag and the ordnance item.
Even at separations greater than two meters, signal-to-noise ratios greater than 5 dB were observed when averaging was performed. Figure 6 shows a spectrum-analyzer view of the FSK signal with a 7-dR signal-to-noise ratio. The data sets were taken with a digital oscilloscope that measured voltage waveforms as a function of time. The digital portion of the integrated circuit in the Tinis tag outputs a digital data stream of 64 bits, which includes synchronization information and information stored in its memory. This digital waveform then drives modulation circuitry that in simple terms transmits a tone at 123 kHz to represent a logical "zero" and a tone at 134 kHz to represent a logical "one."
This type of frequency-domain plot is useful for detecting the presence of a digital FSK signal, but it is not useful for determining the information content of the digital signal. The ultimate detection system will demodulate the FSK signal and determine the underlying data. Such detail was not necessary for this proof-of-concept program. In a future effort, processing could be added to the detection circuitry that would perform the Fourier transform to convert the data to the frequency domain, and allow signal processing that would identify low-level signals in the presence of noise and interference.
Field Testing
The tagged-ordnance system was tested at the Aberdeen Test Center (ATC), located at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Nine tagged surrogates were buried, with three untagged surrogates buried near the tagged surrogates to simulate the presence of buried clutter. ATC provided the location and depth information of the buried objects after their locations were predicted. The detection system shown in Figure 7 was used to transmit the tag-activation signal and to receive the tags' responses. The transmitting coil was one meter in diameter, and the receiving coils were 30.5 cm (12 in) in diameter.
The surrogates were solid steel cylinders that were 5 cmu (2 in) in diameter and 30.5 cm (12 in) long. The nine surrogates had grooves milled into their surface into which tags were embedded. A photo of one of the tagged cylinders is shown in Figure 8 . The tag had 5.65 mm (0.22 inch) of material between it and the surrogate munition, including 2.85 mm of plastic next to the cylinder and 2.8 mm of ferrite next to the tag.
The nine targets were buried in a fairly small area, because there was no need to test search rate at this point in the development cycle. ATC buried the objects in a four-meter by four-meter area. The photograph in Figure 9 shows both UXO detection modules at ATC. The coil module is on the left, and the electronics module is on the right. The silver electronics module contained batteries and an inverter that powered the digital oscilloscope on top of the box.
The signals from the three receiving coils were plotted on the osciilloscope after the scope performed Fourier transforms on the signals. Example frequency-domain plots are shown in Figure 10 . The left and right vertical yellow cursors were positioned at 120 kHz and 130 kHz, respectively. Figure IlOa is indicated with text. The predicted positions are indicated with large-diameter circles, because of the large "footprint" of the coil module. The circle represents the uncertainty in the predicted position of the buried tag, an uncertainty similar to the resolution-cell size in an image. The actual resolution-cell size was not determined experimentally, but modeling indicates it is a function of munition depth and orientation. A shallow munition might be detectable when the center of the coil module is one meter from the position of the buried tag, but a one-meter-deep tag might only be detectable when the center of the coil is within 25.4 cm (10 inches) of a position directly over the tag.
Eight of the nine buried tagged-surrogate positions were predicted. As stated previously, nine tagged surrogates were sent to ATC, but the actual number buried was unknown at the time of the test. Figure 11I indicates the reasonable success in predicting the positions of the eight targets.
One tagged surrogate was missed completely by the predicting process. The missed surrogate, which was buried one meter below the surface, is shown in Figure 12 at position (0.5, 2.5). It was described by ATC personnel as "Tagged surrogate parallel to the surface with the tag down." The phrase "tag down" implies the tag's position on the surrogate was underneath the item, as far from the surface and the coil module as possible, and in the untagged surrogate's shadow. The untagged surrogate was 15.2 cm (6 inches) above and parallel to the tagged surrogate. The figure shows that a data set was taken directly over the missed surrogate. After Battelle provided its predictions and ATC supplied the actual positions, we examined the data set taken at (0.5, 2.5) to see if the tag's signal existed in the data set. In fact, the tag's signal was very strong in the frequency-domain plot. It was concluded that the analysis and decision-making processes used for this test were too simplistic. An improved algorithm was needed.
Although this tagged surrogate's location was not predicted, it is encouraging that the tag's signal was very strong in the data, even though it was at maximum depth at a worst-case position. lInproved data presentation, analysis, and interpretation will allow similar tags to be correctly predicted in future assessment exercises.
A similar test was repeated at ATC in November 2006. Again, the basic plan was for ATC to bury the same nine taggedordnance surrogates at different depths and orientations. Nontagged surrogates were buried near three of the tagged surrogates to simulate the effects of nearby clutter objects. The nine targets were buried in a test lane one meter wide and 25 meters long. The UXO system identified the location of what was believed to be nine surrogates. However, one surrogate was missed, and one surrogate was indicated twice. The data in Figure 12 show general agreement between actual and estimated locations between meter 2 and meter 12.
Figures 13 and 14 provide additional insight into the confusing nature of the ATC data. Figure 13 shows the tag's spectral response, on the left, when the interrogation module was located in the center of the test lane midway between the 7-and 8-meter marks. The green dot with the label "7" represents a buried surrogate. The interrogation module is represented (in the same scale as the test lane) by the rectangular object with the large circle in the center. The large circle represents the interrogation coil, and the three colored circles correspond to the three receiving coils. The green receiving coil's signal in the spectrum is green, and the other two colored coils' signals are represented by their corresponding colors. The spectrum showed that the magenta coil's response was very high at 123 kHz and 134 kHz. The brown coil's signal was strong at 134 kHz, and the tag's reply was not seen by the green coil. (The signal did not appear at 123 kHz in the brown coil's data because the data set was taken at a time when the FSK signal had switched to 134 kHz.) Figure 14 presents the tag's response to the same surrogate when the interrogation module was located in the right-most position between the 7-and 8-meter positions. The tag's response was strong in all three receiving coils. Battelle reported the position of this surrogate in the center of the right lane, at the 7.5-in mark. The one-meter uncertainty in the position prediction is represented by a circle around the red "X" in Figure 13 .
Of primary interest was surrogate 1, located near meter 1 and in the center of the test lane. The detection-interrogation equipment did not detect this tagged surrogate. The transmitting coil was directly over the green dot that represented the tagged surrogate. The magenta receive coil was very near the tagged surrogate. No signal from surrogate I could be identified.
As government personnel unearthed the surrogate for posttesting examination, measurements were made to determine if the tagged surrogate could be sensed by a testing detector coil. This examination determined that the tag was functioning only intermittently. During a later assessment at Battelle, testing indicated that the tag was not functioning properly. It is believed that this surrogate was not functioning the day data sets were taken at ATC, but certainty is not possible.
Past the 12-meter mark in the test lane, examination of Figure 12 revealed that Battelle detected the buried surrogates, but was not accurate in indicating the positions of the surrogates. While we believe our position-indicating system was poor, the plot confirms the confusing situation we encountered, similar to the prior testing. Subsequent work to develop a digital-signal-processing (DSP) -based receiver and analysis system suggest refinements will be possible. A detailed summary of all the data can be found elsewhere [61.
Summary
This study showed that the use of RFID tags to aid detection of UXO is feasible. Tags with solenoidal geometry, similar to the TI Tinis tag, are preferred for practical signal-detection reasons.
24
These tags showed promise for being able to be mounted on munitions, as well as surviving launch and impact. Analysis provided insight into the parameter variations necessary for optimizing the system, such as mounting the tags with some separation from the munition's surface to allow sufficient magnetic energy into the tag and to allow the tag to operate properly. Field testing with the UXO interrogation-system prototype was successful. Efforts incorporating further optimal design and detection-algorithm adjustments remain.
